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Abstract
The fact that humans cooperate with non-kin in large groups, or with people
they will never meet again, is a long-standing evolutionary puzzle. Altruism, the
capacity to perform costly acts that confer benefits on others, is at the core of coop-
erative behavior. Behavioral experiments show that humans have a predisposition
to cooperate with others and to punish non-cooperators at personal cost (so-called
strong reciprocity) which, according to standard evolutionary game arguments, can
not arise from selection acting on individuals. This has led to the suggestion of
group and cultural selection as the only mechanisms that can explain the evolu-
tionary origin of human altruism. We introduce an agent-based model inspired on
the Ultimatum Game, that allows us to go beyond the limitations of standard evo-
lutionary game theory and show that individual selection can indeed give rise to
strong reciprocity. Our results are consistent with the existence of neural correlates
of fairness and in good agreement with observations on humans and monkeys.
Keywords: Strong reciprocity, Individual selection, Evolutionary theories,
Behavioral evolution, Evolutionary game theory
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1 Introduction
Ever since Darwin first faced this problem (Darwin, 1871; Gould, 2002), the aris-
ing of human cooperation has been a subject of intense debate within the frame-
work of evolutionary theories. Cooperation has been linked to altruism, which
can be defined as the capacity to perform costly acts that confer benefits on others
(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). Previous theoretical approaches to altruism have
shown that in many instances altruistic behavior is not truly so, in so far as they
yield benefits for the altruist in the future. This is the case when the recipients of
the altruistic act are relatives, well understood within kin selection theory (Hamil-
ton, 1964). Altruism in the absence of kin relationships has also been explained in
terms of repeated interaction leading to cooperation (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981;
Trivers, 1971), indirect benefit through reputation gains (Leimar and Hammerstein,
2001; Milinski et al., 2002; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998) or costly signalling the-
ories (Gintis et al., 2001). However, recent behavioral experiments show that hu-
mans can perform altruistic acts when interactions are anonymous and one-shot,
i.e., in conditions which exclude all the explanations proposed so far (Fehr et al.,
2002; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002; Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003; Henrich et al., 2001).
Indeed, it has been observed that individuals are ready to punish non-cooperators
(altruistic punishment) as well as to reward cooperative behavior (altruistic reward-
ing) even when doing so will not produce any benefit for the punisher or rewarder.
This set of behaviors has been termed strong reciprocity (Fehr et al., 2002; Gintis,
2000) and, as such, it has been proposed as a schema for understanding altruism in
humans (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis et al., 2003).
Substantial evidence in favor of the existence of strong reciprocity comes from
experiments using the so-called Ultimatum Game (Gu¨th et al., 1982), and from
agent-based models (Bowles et al., 2003b; Bowles and Gintis, 2004; Boyd et al.,
2003) [see (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis et al., 2003) for summaries]. In the
Ultimatum Game, under conditions of anonymity, two players are shown a sum of
money, say 100 e . One of the players, the “proposer”, is instructed to offer any
amount, from 1 e to 100 e , to the other, the “responder”. The proposer can make
only one offer, which the responder can accept or reject. If the offer is accepted,
the money is shared accordingly; if rejected, both players receive nothing. Since
the game is played only once (no repeated interactions) and anonymously (no rep-
utation gain), a self-interested responder will accept any amount of money offered.
Therefore, self-interested proposers will offer the minimum possible amount, 1 e ,
which will be accepted. To be sure, this is a backward-induction way of reason-
ing, which leads to the conclusion that the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is
the relevant one. However, the Ultimatum game has many Nash equilibria, which
can play a role in the results we report below (see, e.g., Samuelson, 1997, or Gin-
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tis, 2000, for complete game-theoretical discussions on this issue). We will come
back to this question in Sec. 6. Notwithstanding, in actual Ultimatum Game ex-
periments with human subjects, average offers do not even approximate the self-
interested prediction. Generally speaking, proposers offer respondents very sub-
stantial amounts (50 % being a typical modal offer) and respondents frequently
reject offers below 30 %. Most of the experiments have been carried out with
university students in western countries, showing a large degree of individual vari-
ability but a striking uniformity between groups in average behavior. A recent ex-
periment (Gu¨th et al., 2003) used newspaper readers in order to have a population
with broader characteristics and background, finding qualitatively similar results.
Interestingly, a large study in 15 small-scale societies (Henrich et al., 2001) found
that, in all cases, respondents or proposers behave in a reciprocal manner. Fur-
thermore, the behavioral variability across groups was much larger than previously
observed: while mean offers in the case of university students are in the range
43%-48%, in the cross-cultural study they ranged from 26% to 58%.
The fact that indirect reciprocity is excluded by the anonymity condition and
that interactions are one-shot allows one to interpret rejections in terms of strong
reciprocity (Fehr et al., 2002; Gintis, 2000). This amounts to considering that these
behaviors are truly altruistic, i.e., that they are costly for the individual performing
them in so far as they do not result in direct or indirect benefit. As a consequence,
we immediately face an evolutionary puzzle: the negative effects of altruistic acts
must decrease the altruist’s fitness as compared to the that of the recipients of the
benefit, ultimately leading to the extinction of altruists. Indeed, standard evolution-
ary game theory arguments applied to the Ultimatum Game lead to the expectation
that in a mixed population, punishers (individuals who reject low offers) have less
chance to survive than rational players (indivuals who accept any offer) and even-
tually disappear (Page and Nowak 2000, 2002). Although much attention has been
devoted to this issue by researchers in differents aspects of evolutionary theory, the
problem is yet far from understood (Bowles et al., 2003a; Hammerstein, 2003; Vo-
gel, 2004) To date, the only way out to this dilemma seems, following the original
suggestion of Darwin (Darwin, 1871), to invoke group and cultural selection to
compensate for the negative effects that reciprocity is assumed to have on individ-
uals (Bowles et al., 2003b, Boyd et al., 2003; Hammerstein, 2003).
2 One parameter model
In order to assess the possible evolutionary origins of these behaviors, we introduce
and analyze here a drastically simplified model. Imagine a population of N players
of the Ultimatum Game with a fixed sum of money M per game. Random pairs of
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players are chosen, of which one is the proposer and another one is the respondent.
In its simplest version, we will assume that players are capable of other-regarding
behavior (empathy); consequently, in order to optimize their gain, proposers of-
fer the minimum amount of money that they would accept. Every agent has her
own, fixed acceptance threshold, 1 ≤ ti ≤ M (ti are always integer numbers for
simplicity). Agents have only one strategy: respondents reject any offer smaller
than their own acceptance threshold, and accept offers otherwise. Although we
believe that this is the way in which ‘empathic’ agents will behave, in order not to
hinder other strategies a priori, we have also considered the possibility that agents
have two independent acceptance and offer thresholds. As we will see below, this
does not change our main results and conclusions. Money shared as a consequence
of accepted offers accumulates to the capital of each of the involved players. As
our main aim is to study selection acting on modified descendants, hereafter we
interpret this capital as ‘fitness’ (here used in a loose, Darwinian sense, not in the
more restrictive one of reproductive rate). After s games, the agent with the over-
all minimum fitness is removed (randomly picked if there are several) and a new
agent is introduced by duplicating that with the maximum fitness, i.e., with the
same threshold and the same fitness (again randomly picked if there are several).
Mutation is introduced in the duplication process by allowing changes of ±1 in
the acceptance threshold of the newly generated player with probability 1/3 each.
Agents have no memory (i.e., interactions are one-shot) and no information about
other agents (i.e., no reputation gains are possible).
Two remarks about our model are in order before proceeding any further. First,
we need to clarify the motivation for our choice of simple, memoryless agents.
It is likely that in early human societies some degree of repeated interaction and
reputation effects was present, factors that we have excluded from our model. In
this respect, we stress that what we are actually trying to show is that the behavior
observed in the experiments quoted above (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003), can arise
by individual selection in the absence of precisely those two ingredients, repeated
interactions and reputation: In other words, the existence of repeated interactions
and reputation is not a necessary condition for the selection of altruistic-like behav-
iors at the individual level. In that case, actual circumstances of human evolution
would reinforce the tendency to the appearance of altruism. The fact that similar
results are found in Ultimatum game experiments in a wide range of small scale
societies (Henrich et al., 2001) suggests that our conclusions will have to be kept
in mind when dealing with early human behavior, as the relevance of these two
influences is largely different in the studied societies. Second, we want to stress
that our mutation rate, which we choose somewhat large to enhance the fluctuation
effects (see related comments in Sec. 5 below), should not be understood from the
genetic viewpoint, but rather from the phenotypical viewpoint. Indeed, the inher-
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itance of an acceptance threshold like the one we are proposing may perfectly be
also affected by cultural transmission, and it is therefore subject to a large indi-
vidual variability. Observations reported in the literature (Fehr and Fischbacher,
2003; Gintis et al., 2003) support this great variability. On the other hand, it has
to be borne in mind that even if the mutation rate may seem large, mutations are
small, with relative changes of the order of 1/100 in the acceptance threshold. We
believe that such changes from parent to child are actually very likely, and hence
our choice for the mutation rate.
3 Results
Figure 1 shows that strong reciprocity, in the form of altruistic punishment, can be
selected for at the individual level in small populations ranging from N = 10 to
N = 10000 agents when selection is strong (s = 1). The initial distribution of
thresholds rapidly leads to a peaked function, with the range of acceptance thresh-
olds for the agents covering about a 10% of the available ones. The position of the
peak (understood as the mean acceptance threshold) fluctuates during the length
of the simulation, never reaching a stationary value for the durations we have ex-
plored. The width of the peak fluctuates as well, but in a much smaller scale than
the position. At certain instants the distribution exhibits two peaks (see distribu-
tion at 7.5 million games). This is the mechanism by which the position of the
peak moves around the possible acceptance thresholds. Importantly, the typical
evolution we are describing does not depend on the initial condition. In particular,
a population consisting solely of self-interested agents, i.e., all initial thresholds
are set to ti = 1, evolves in the same fashion. The value M of the capital at stake
in every game is not important either, and increasing M only leads to a higher
resolution of the threshold distribution function.
The success of reciprocators does not depend on the selection rate (although
the detailed dynamics does). Figure 2 shows the result of a simulation with 1000
agents in which the removal-duplication process takes place once every s = 10000
games. To show further that the initial conditions are irrelevant, for this plot we
have chosen an initial population of self-interested agents. As we may see, the
evolution is now much less noisy, and the distribution is narrower, becoming highly
peaked and immobile after a transient. The value of s at which this regime appears
increases with the population size. The final mean acceptance threshold at which
simulations stabilize depends on the specific run, but it is very generally a value
between 40 and 50. We thus see that the selection rate may be responsible for the
particulars of the simulation outcome, but it is not a key factor for the emergence
of strong reciprocity in our model. We note, however, that taking very large values
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for s or, strictly speaking, considering the limit s/N → ∞, does lead to different
results. See next section for a detailed discussion.
4 Discussion
Among the results summarized above, the evolution of a population entirely formed
by self-interested players into a diversified population with a large majority of al-
truists is the most relevant and surprising one. We will now argue that the underly-
ing reason for this is the presence of fluctuations (or noise) in our model. For the
sake of definiteness, let us consider the case s = 1 (agent replacement takes place
after every game) although the discussion applies to larger (but finite) values of s
as well. After one or more games, a mutation event will take place and a “weak
altruistic punisher” (an agent with ti = 2) will appear in the population, with a
fitness inherited from its ancestor. For this new agent to be removed at the next
iteration so that the population reverts to its uniform state, our model rules imply
that this agent has to have the lowest fitness, that is the only one with that value of
fitness, and also that it does not play as a proposer in the next game (if playing as a
responder the agent will earn nothing because of her threshold). In any other event
this altruistic punisher will survive at least one cycle, in which an additional one
can appear by mutation. Note also that in case a “weak altruistic punisher” is cho-
sen to act as a proposer, she earns a large amount of fitness, which would allow her
to survive for many death-birth cycles, and during those she could even accumu-
late more fitness in case she is selected to play again as proposer. It is important to
realize that this does not imply any constraint on the number of times the emergent
weak punisher is picked up as respondent: in that case, and until a second punisher
arises from mutation, acting as a respondent the punisher will simply earn nothing,
while the selfish agent playing the role of proposer in that game would not earn
the 99 fitness units she would earn if she met another selfish agent. Therefore, the
survival of the first punisher does not depend on (and it may actually be favored
by) the number of times she acts as respondent, as one would expect in a realistic
situation.
The above discussion is in fact an example, something like a worst-case sce-
nario for the s = 1 case, and one can easily imagine other ways a newly created
punisher may survive. Our intention is to illustrate the crucial fact that fluctuations
(i.e., the fact that the recently appeared altruist is chosen to play or not, or that
it is chosen to be removed if there are more than one with the lowest fitness, or
other, selfish agents are not selected to play in one or several intervals) allow for
survival and growth of the population of altruists. It is interesting to note that in the
dynamics in which all players play against every other once, i.e., in the replicator
6
dynamics (see next paragraph for more on this), the average fitness earned by each
type of agent can be computed analytically as a function of the frequency of the
types in the population. From that result, it is easy to find out the threshold value
required for one type to have a fitness advantage on the other. In particular, it can
be shown that if a 3% of an initial ti = 1 population turns to ti = 2, the latter
ones will outperform the originally self-interested agents. Note also that, in our
model, it can also be shown that the number of times a particular agent is chosen
to play is a random variable given by a Poisson distribution of mean s/N (and of
standard deviation
√
s/N , which for s/N ≫ 1 becomes negligible with respect to
the mean). Therefore, irrespective of their threshold, some agents will have played
more than others and may have accumulated more capital, subsequently being less
exposed to removal. All this scenario is what we refer to as ‘dynamics governed
by fluctuations.’
In the context of the above discussion, it is very illustrative to compare our
results with previous studies of the Ultimatum Game by Page and Nowak (Page
and Nowak 2000, 2002). The model introduced in those works has a dynamics
completely different from ours: following standard evolutionary game theory, ev-
ery player plays every other one in both roles (proponent and respondent), and
afterwards players reproduce with probability proportional to their payoff (which
is fitness in the reproductive sense). Simulations and adaptive dynamics equations
show then that the population ends up composed by players with fair (50%) thresh-
olds. This is different from our observations, in which we hardly ever reach an
equilibrium (only for large s) and even then equilibria set up at values different
from the fair share. The reason for this difference is that the Page-Nowak model
dynamics describes the s/N → ∞ limit of our model, in which between death-
reproduction events the time average gain all players obtain is the mean payoff
with high accuracy. We thus see that our model is more general because it has
one free parameter, s, that allows selecting different regimes whereas the Page-
Nowak dynamics is only one limiting case. Those different regimes are what we
have described as fluctuation dominated (when s/N is finite and not too large) and
the regime analyzed by Page and Nowak (when s/N → ∞). This amounts to
saying that by varying s we can study regimes far from the standard evolutionary
game theory limit. As a result, we find a variability of outcomes for the accep-
tance threshold consistent with the observations in real human societies (Fehr and
Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis et al., 2003; Henrich et al., 2001).
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5 Two parameter model
To further confirm the differences between our approach and Page and Nowak’s
one, we have considered the same alternative as they did, namely to assign agents
a new strategical variable, oi, defined as the amount offered by player i when acting
as proponent, and subject to the same mutation rules as the acceptance threshold,
ti. While Page and Nowak observed that in their setup, this modification of the
model led to fully rational players (i.e., in our model, ti = oi = 1), except for fluc-
tuations due to mutations. Figure 3 shows clearly that in our model the dynamics
remains very complicated and equilibria are never reached within the duration of
our simulations. Once again, this is due to the fact that the dynamics we propose
does not remove the fluctuations of the payoff obtained by the players as the limit
s/N →∞ does. It is clear that many other choices for the dynamics are possible,
aside from choosing different values for s. For instance, a certain percentage of
the population could be replaced in reproduction events instead of just the least fit
individual. Another possibility would be the selection of individuals to be replaced
with probability given by their fitness. Notwithstanding, our main point here is
that our dynamics is far away from the replicator or adaptive ones, and the form
we choose for the replacement is intend to make easier and faster to visualize the
fluctuation effects. Our choice for the large mutation rate points in the same di-
rection as well, i.e., helps amplify the effect of fluctuations. In this respect, the
question arises as to the influence of such a large mutation rate in our results. To
exclude any dependence of our main conclusion, namely the appearance of altru-
istic punishers even in an initially selfish population, on the value of this quantity,
we simulated the same model for smaller mutation rates. Figure 4 shows clearly
that even for mutation rates as small as 1/3000 the population is taken over by
the altruistic punishers, although at a correspondingly larger time. Of course, the
larger the mutation rate, the wider the histogram of the population, and therefore,
for the smallest values the acceptance threshold distribution is very sharply peaked
around the mean value (see inset in Figure 3). For even smaller rates, (of the order
of 10−4 or similar genetic mutation rates) the amount of time needed for altruis-
tic individuals to establish becomes exceedingly large, and out of the scope of our
computing capabilities. We believe that different rules for the dynamics would lead
to qualitatively similar results in so far as they do not approach Page and Nowak’s
(which we could call deterministic) limit.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that altruistic-like behavior, specifically, altruistic
punishment, may arise by means of exclusive individual selection even in the ab-
sence of repeated interactions and reputation gains. Our conclusion is important in
so far as it is generally believed that some kind of group selection is needed to un-
derstand the observed human behavior. The reason for that is that game theoretical
arguments apparently show that altruists are at disadvantage with respect to selfish
individual. In this respect, another relevant conclusion of the present work is that
perspectives and approaches alternative to standard evolutionary game theory may
be needed in order to understand paradoxical features such as the appearance of
altruistic punishment. We begin by discussing this second conclusion and proceed
to the first one afterwards.
As we have seen, in our model the effects of finite time between generations
(more precisely, the effect of keeping s finite) and of stochasticity play a non triv-
ial role and sustain strong reciprocity (existence of players with ti > 1) even if
acceptance and offer obey independent rules. Regarding this, it is important to no-
tice that the way fluctuations enter our model is directly through the evolutionary
dynamics we propose. Other important effects of noise have been reported in the
literature (Gale et al., 1995; Binmore and Samuelson, 1999) in which fluctuations
are included into a replicator dynamics for the Ultimatum game to account for im-
perfections in the learning process. In our case, there is no learning at all (agents
have no memory) and therefore the source of noise is the dynamics itself, i.e., the
random differences between the number of games every player plays between se-
lection events. Interestingly, randomness arising from finiteness of the population
has also been shown to change the evolutionary stability of cooperation (Nowak et
al., 2004). In a related context, it has been recently reported that spatial structure,
previously regarded as beneficial for the evolution of cooperation on the basis of
results on the evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma, may in fact inhibit it (Hauert and
Doebeli, 2004). Finally, let us also mention the recent results about the evolution of
strong altruism in randomly formed groups when they exist for more than one gen-
eration (Fletcher and Zwick, 2004). All these unexpected and non trivial results,
along with our present report suggest that general approaches, involving different,
non-standard dynamics, beyond standard evolutionary game theory, and particu-
larly computer simulations of agent models, may provide insights into the issue of
how cooperation arises. Interestingly, it has been argued that empathy (or fairness),
i.e., the fact that agents offer what they themselves are prepared to accept, does not
arise evolutionary on its own (Page and Nowak, 2002). While those results are not
questioned, they have been obtained in the framework of adaptive dynamics. We
believe, along the same line of reasoning we are presenting here, that the effect
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of fluctuations as described in the previous section may be enough to originate
and sustain fairness in finite populations, which would in turn justify our model
from the game theoretical viewpoint. In this regard, an interesting question arises
when one considers the possibility of observing similar behavior in dilemma-type
games (such as the prisonner’s dilemma, see Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). In that
kind of games, the Nash equilibrium structure is much simpler than in the Ultima-
tum game: Usually, they have only one equilibrium. It may then be that in those
situations, departure from that equilibrium by individual selection alone without
additional ingredients is much more difficult. In other words, the existence of nu-
merous Nash equilibria in the Ultimatum game may facilitate the creative role of
the fluctuations in leading the population away from the self-interested type. It
would be interesting to analyse the case of dilemma-type games in the light of our
findings here. Work along these lines is in progress.
Evolutionary explanations of strong reciprocity have been advanced in terms
of gene-culture coevolution (Bowles et al., 2003b; Bowles and Gintis, 2004; Boyd
et al., 2003; Gintis, 2003; Hammerstein, 2003; Henrich and Boyd, 2001). The
underlying rationale is that altruistic behavior leads to fitness disadvantages at the
individual level. But why must strong reciprocators have lower fitness than other
members of their group? While alternative compensating factors (e.g., sexual se-
lection) have been suggested (Bowles et al., 2003a), our results show clearly that, in
the context of the Ultimatum Game, altruistic punishment (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002)
may be established by individual selection alone. Our simulations are consistent
with the large degree of variability among individuals (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003;
Gintis et al., 2003) and among societies (Henrich et al., 2001), and reproduce the
fact that typical offers are much larger than self-interested ones, but lower than a
fair share. While in our model agents have other-regarding behavior (empathy),
i.e., agents offer the minimum they would accept if offered to them, this is not a
requisite for the emergence of strong reciprocators as the two-threshold simula-
tions show. The population evolves by descent with modification and individual
selection, as the model does not implement cultural (other than parent-to-child
transmission) or group selection of any kind. To be sure, we do not mean that these
mechanisms are irrelevant for the appearance and shaping of altruism: what we
are showing is that strong reciprocity (and hence altruism) may arise in their ab-
sence. Observations of strongly reciprocal behavior in capucin monkeys (Brosnan
and de Waal, 2003), where cultural transmission, if any, is weak, strengthens this
conclusion. Further support for our thesis comes from reports of individual, pre-
existent acceptance thresholds shown by neural activity measurements in (Sanfey
et al., 2003). In this respect, neural mechanisms gratifying cooperation as those
demonstrated in (Rilling et al., 2002) may have evolved to reinforce behaviors se-
lected for at the individual level as we are suggesting. Of course, those results do
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not preclude cultural influences in the brain control of altruistic behavior, which
may play an important part in determining the experimentally observed thresh-
olds. What is more relevant here is that individual thresholds do exist, with a large
amount of individual variability, much like in our model, instead of a single cul-
turally prescribed threshold. Evidence seems to favor one common threshold for
acceptance and rejection but it is not strong enough to exclude the other version
of the model. The detrimental effects of unfair sanctions on altruism (Fehr and
Rockenbach, 2003) is yet another piece of evidence in favor of the existence of
such individual acceptance (‘fairness’) thresholds.
In closing, let us emphasize that our conclusion that altruism does not neces-
sarily have negative consequences for individuals draws such theories nearer to a
biological perspective. Indeed, our results suggest that, despite its not being self-
evident, altruistic strategies may do better in terms of fitness than selfish ones, even
without repeated interactions or reputation gain. This conclusion, which would im-
ply that strictly speaking there is no truly altruistic behavior, may have far-reaching
implications in decision-making models and the design of public policies (Bowles
et al., 2003a; Vogel, 2004).
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Figure captions
Figure 1 Non-self-interested behavior establishes spontaneosuly on small pop-
ulations. Population size is N = 1000, the capital to be shared per game is
M = 100. Death and birth takes place after every game (s = 1). Initial acceptance
thresholds are distributed uniformly (ti = t0 conditions lead to the same output).
Plotted are the distributions of acceptance threshold at the beginning of the simu-
lation and after 2, 7.5 and 10 million games. Inset: Mean acceptance threshold as
a function of simulated time, is averaged over intervals of 10000 games to reduce
noise (in the raw data spikes appear that go above 50 or below 10). The red line in
the inset is the average over all times of the mean, located at 33.45.
Figure 2 Slow selection rates lead to stationary acceptance threshold distribu-
tions very narrowly peaked. Population size is N = 1000, the capital to be shared
per game is M = 100 and selection is weak (s = 10000). Initial agents are
all self-interested (ti = 1). Plotted is the distribution of acceptance threshold at
the end of the simulation. There are no agents with thresholds outside the plot-
ted range. Inset: Mean acceptance threshold as a function of simulated time. The
asymptotically stable mean is very slowly approaching 47.
Figure 3 Introduction of an independent level for the amount of money offered
by the agents does not change our conclusions. Population size is N = 1000, the
capital to be shared per game is M = 100 and selection is intermediate (s = 1000).
Initial agents are all fully rational (ti = oi = 1). Plotted are the distribution
of acceptance threshold (ired) and offered amount (green) after 50 million games
(dashed) and 100 million games (solid). Upper inset: Mean acceptance threshold
and offered amount as a function of simulated time. The offered amount is most of
the time larger than the acceptance threshold, and occasional crosses lead to a very
slow dynamics until the situation is restored (see the plateaus around 62.5 million
games, and corresponding distributions in the lower inset).
Figure 4 Simulation results do not depend on the mutation rate. Population size
is N = 10000, the capital to be shared per game is M = 100. Death and birth
takes place after every game (s = 1). Initial agents are all self-interested (ti = 1).
Plotted is the mean value of the acceptance threshold vs time in number of games
(which for s = 1 equals the number of generations). Mutation rates are as indicated
in the plot. Inset: Distribution of the acceptance threshold at the end of each of the
simulations. The fact that the peak of every distribution is displaced to the left for
14
larger mutation rates is an irrelevant coincidence: The peak positions fluctuate in
time (as indicated by the mean value in the main plot).
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